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The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) was utilized as a means of interpreting disgust in
terms of the six domains of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder as defined by the Obsessive Compulsive
Cognitions Working Group; excessive responsibility, overestimation of threat, perfectionism, intoler-
ance for uncertainty, over importance of thoughts and need to control thoughts. A non-clinical sample
(N¼44 undergraduate students) completed an IRAP designed to assess appraisals of disgust-inducing
pictorial stimuli based on the six belief domains at the implicit level. A series of self-report measures
including the Obsessive-Beliefs Questionnaire, the Padua Inventory and the STAI were also implemen-
ted. Results indicated that a greater bias toward appraising disgusting stimuli as being negative was
related to excessive responsibility and overestimation of threat along with perfectionism and
intolerance for uncertainty. Critically, these effects were found to be independent of anxiety supporting
the influence of disgust responding in the etiology of OC tendencies.
& 2013 Association for Contextual Behavioral Science. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The role of disgust in the etiology of psychopathologies such as
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) has been the focus of much
research in the last decade. Disgust is a universally experienced
negative emotion which has implications for the cognitive and
behavioral domains of OCD. Many experiences may elicit disgust,
for example, body-envelope violations, experiences involving
animals or body waste or particular socio-moral scenarios
(Haidt, McCauley & Rozin, 1994). Measures (both implicit and
explicit) have been developed to assess individual differences in
general disgust and its two constituents, disgust propensity (i.e.,
an individual’s tendency to experience disgust) and sensitivity
(i.e., how negatively the individual appraises their experience of
disgust) (Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012a; van Overveld, De
Jong, Peters, Cavanagh & Davey, 2006). Numerous studies have
utilized such measures in an attempt to delineate the influence of
disgust, as an individual emotion, in the etiology of OCD.
Disgust has been related to general OCD symptoms and
washing concerns in OCD, using self-report measures and this
effect was independent of anxiety (Olatunji et al., 2007). Moretz &
McKay (2008) demonstrated that disgust influences general OCD
symptoms and beliefs, including washing concerns and contam-
ination fears, without any influence of anxiety. Thus, it appearsr Contextual Behavioral Science. P
: þ353 1 708 4767.
holson).from the literature that disgust does not merely influence the
symptomatology of OCD through anxiety, rather it is a distinct
emotion worthy of individual empirical investigation. While the
evidence is promising, the specific cognitive mechanisms through
which disgust influences OCD remain largely unclear. Cognitive
approaches to obsessions posit that it is the misinterpretation of
intrusive thoughts, feelings and images as being highly important
which drives problematic behavior such as avoidance, reassur-
ance seeking and excessive washing (Rachman, 1997, 1998;
Salkovskis, 1985; Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman & Freeston,
1999). Thus, it may be that overtly negative interpretations of
the initial feeling of disgust result in behaviors specific to OCD
such as excessive washing and checking (Teachman, 2006).
The Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (1997)
have highlighted the relevance of cognitive content and processes
in the etiology and maintenance of OCD. Critically, they have
emphasized the importance of the interpretations (e.g., beliefs
and appraisals) that follow intrusive thoughts such as ‘‘For me,
having bad urges is as bad as actually carrying them out’’ or ‘‘Even
if harm is unlikely, I should try to prevent it at any cost’’ Obsessive
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (2005). These background
beliefs provide a context in which the intrusive thought is more
likely to cause distress which result in the individual engaging in
compulsive and problematic behaviors as a means of reducing
this distress (Rachman, 1998). The OCCWG has identified six
cognitive belief domains of OCD (1) excessive responsibility; (2)
overestimation of threat; (3) perfectionism; (4) intolerance of
uncertainty; (5) over-importance of thoughts and (6) need toublished by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Group (2001). These six domains have been narrowed down to
three factors which can be measured by the Obsessive Belief
Questionnaire, (1) responsibility/overestimation of threat; (2) per-
fectionism/intolerance of uncertainty; (3) over-importance/need
to control thoughts (OBQ-44; Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions
Working Group, 2005). These beliefs lead individuals to appraise
otherwise harmless thoughts, feelings and images as being
harmful and dangerous (Wu & Carter, 2008).
Teachman (2006) argued that these cognitive domains provide a
useful platform on which to establish the interpretation processes
at work in disgust. Evidence from the literature suggests there
are inconsistencies regarding the exact nature of the relationship
between disgust responding, contamination fear and cognitive belief
domains. For instance, Moretz & McKay (2008) found that disgust
propensity as measured by the Disgust Scale (van Overveld, De Jong,
Peters & Schouten, 2011) was related to obsessive beliefs. David,
Olatunji, Armstrong, Ciesielski, Bondy & Broman-Fulks (2009) found
that disgust sensitivity failed to remain a significant predictor of
OCD symptoms when controlling for obsessive beliefs (as measured
by the OBQ). Evidence from Cisler, Brady, Olatunji & Lohr (2010)
suggests that cognitive beliefs may influence the role played by
disgust in contamination fear, but this evidence is based on disgust
propensity, which is the initial intrusive feeling of disgust. To the
best of our knowledge, no previous study has attempted to delineate
the relationship between disgust and obsessive beliefs by specifi-
cally measuring obsessive beliefs (as measured by the OBQ) in
response to disgust-eliciting stimuli.
The IRAP is a computer-based procedure which requires
participants to respond accurately and rapidly to sets of stimuli
in a manner that is consistent or inconsistent with their previous
learning history. It was derived from a modern behavior-analytic
account of human language and cognition called Relational Frame
Theory (RFT; see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001). The
basic assumption of RFT is that the fundamental components of
human language and cognition are relational, and thus the IRAP
focuses on assessing relations between stimuli (e.g. Hughes,
Barnes-Holmes & De Houwer, 2011). The unit of measurement
is response latency from the presentation of the stimuli to the
emission of a correct response. The fundamental hypothesis is
that responding should be quicker across blocks of trials that are
consistent rather than inconsistent with a previously established
bias. The IRAP provides an advantage over other so-called implicit
measures as it can assess propositional relations between con-
cepts rather than mere associations (see Hughes et al., 2011 for a
detailed treatment of this issue).
The fundamental IRAP effect which posits that responding
should be quicker on bias consistent relative to bias-inconsistent
trials has been explained in terms of the Relational Elaboration
and Coherence model (REC; Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes,
Stewart, & Boles, 2010). The REC model assumes that brief and
immediate relational responses (BIRRs) will occur on most trials
of the IRAP before a participant presses a response key. These
responses will be based on historical and existing contextual
variables, with the most likely response being emitted first
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). This effect has been demonstrated
in numerous studies pertaining to, for example, self-esteem
(Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes & Stewart, 2009), spider
fear (Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012b), sexual attraction to
children among sexual offenders (Dawson, Barnes-Holmes, Gresswell,
Hart & Gore, 2009) and cocaine dependence (Carpenter, Martinez,
Vadhan, Barnes-Holmes & Nunes, 2012), to name a few.
Implicit measures offer many advantages over traditional self-
report measures in the study of anxiety due to the seemingly
uncontrollable and often conflicting nature of anxious phenom-
ena, such as obsessions. In effect, the uncontrollable nature ofanxiety seems to overlap with the types of psychological pheno-
mena that implicit measures were designed to target (see Wiers,
Teachman & De Houwer, 2007). Critically, research suggests that
participants have limited control over their responses on the IRAP
(e.g., Dawson, et al., 2009; McKenna, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes & Stewart, 2007). Further, recent evidence suggests that
implicit measures may be able to provide insight into psycho-
logical constructs, the exact nature of which was previously
unclear. A study on disgust using the IRAP demonstrated the
utility of the IRAP at providing construct validity for an emotion
(i.e., disgust) that had been previously ill-defined (Nicholson &
Barnes-Holmes, 2012a). Thus, implicit measures appear to offer
promising methodologies for measuring the cognitive mechan-
isms underlying anxiety disorders such as OCD.
Increasing evidence from research using the IRAP suggests that
it is the appraisal that follows the initial disgust-related thought
that is indicative of avoidance behavior rather than the initial
thought itself (e.g., Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012a). This
research utilized two IRAPs, one for disgust propensity and
another for disgust sensitivity. Results demonstrated that each
construct had a relationship with OC tendencies; however, these
relations were different at the behavioral and symptomatic levels.
It was found that disgust sensitivity predicted avoidance behavior
independently of anxiety and was related to OC tendencies,
specifically washing concerns. On the other hand, disgust pro-
pensity predicted OC tendencies and obsessing symptoms, inde-
pendently of anxiety. This evidence suggests that not only can
disgust interpretations be measured by the IRAP but they can be
used to predict avoidance behavior and OC symptoms. However,
this study merely examined disgust as being fearful, worrisome
and intolerable with no reference to the cognitive belief domains
specific to OCD such as excessive responsibility, perfectionism,
overestimation of threat, intolerance of uncertainty and the need
to control thoughts. As such the IRAP may offer a way of assess-
ing the relevance of the obsessive beliefs domains in disgust
responding.
The finding that appraisal of an initial feeling or intrusive
thought appears to be a fundamental aspect of OCD provides
support for both the seminal work of Salkovskis’ (1985) on
obsessions and more recent conceptual analyses arising from
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT). Specifically,
Salkovskis argued that intrusive thoughts, in the context of
OCD carry little no valence until they are positively, negatively
or neutrally appraised. Similarly, the ACT model suggests that
treatment should target responses to cognitive experiences (such
as intrusive thoughts) rather than specific content or emotions
(Twohig, 2009). According to both views, therefore, it is not the
initial reaction to OCD-relevant stimuli, but the reaction to
the reaction that is key in defining and perhaps treating
OCD itself. Thus research which builds on that of Nicholson &
Barnes-Holmes, 2012b could be seen as being directly relevant to
both ‘‘traditional’’ CBT work in this area as well as ‘‘third-wave’’
behavior therapies.
The current study aimed to assess obsessive beliefs, as mea-
sured by the OBQ-44, in relation to disgust at the implicit level.
The IRAP was used as a means to measure appraisals pertaining to
obsessive beliefs in response to both disgust-eliciting and gener-
ically pleasant pictorial stimuli as well as positive descriptive
words in response to the same stimuli. Questionnaires assessing
obsessive beliefs, general OC tendencies and anxiety were also
implemented as a comparison to the IRAP. As this was the first
study to assess disgust in this manner, we refrained from making
specific predictions. However, it was assumed that those who
score highly on the explicit measures, specifically the OBQ, would
produce greater implicit negative appraisals of the disgusting
stimuli.
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2.1. Participants
There were no selection criteria in order to take part in this
study with regards levels of disgust or OC tendencies. There is
increasing support for the idea that OCD symptoms originate
in normal human processing. Therefore, the use of non-patient
samples that score high on self-report measures of OCD may be
relevant to understanding the development of OCD (see Burns,
Formea, Koertege & Sternberger, 1995). Participants (N¼44;
13 men and 31 women) were selected from the student popula-
tion of NUI Maynooth. The mean age of the participants was 26.7
with a range of 18–46 years. Each participant provided written
informed consent prior to taking part in the study and completed
the experiment individually in the Department of Psychology at
NUI Maynooth.1 The picture numbers from the IAPS were as follows: 1201, 9405, 1440, 1463,
1710, 5731, 5760, 1114, 5780, 3250, 9300. The twelfth picture was a photo of a
dirty kitchen.3. Materials
3.1. Obsessive Belief Questionnaire-44 (OBQ-44; OCCWG, 2005)
The Obsessive Belief Questionnaire is a 44 item self-report
scale designed to measure individual differences in obsessive
beliefs across three cognitive domains of OCD. It consists of three
factors including (1) responsibility/threat (e.g. ‘‘If I do not take
extra precautions, I am more likely than others to have or cause a
serious disaster.’’), (2) perfectionism/uncertainty (e.g. ‘‘In order to
be a worthwhile person, I must be perfect at everything I do.’’),
(3) importance/control of thoughts (e.g. ‘‘If I have aggressive
thoughts or impulses about loved ones, this means I may secretly
want to hurt them.’’). Each item is rated on a 7-point (1–7) Likert
scale of agreement with belief statements. Internal consistency
achieved in this sample was approaching excellent (a¼ .785).
3.2. Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002)
The OCI-R is an 18 item self-report measure of symptoms of
obsessive-compulsive disorder and was used to measure OC
tendencies. It has successfully differentiated between individuals
with and without OCD. For a non-anxious sample, it has demon-
strated good-excellent internal consistency (Z .72), and test–
retest reliability (.57–.87).
3.3. Padua inventory-Washington State University Revision
(PI-WSUR; Burns, Formea, Koertege & Sternberger, 1995)
The Padua Inventory-Washington State University Revision is a
39 item self-report scale designed to measure obsessive and
compulsive symptoms. It is also designed to reduce overlap with
worry. Each item is rated on a 5-point (0–4) Likert scale assessing
the degree of disturbance caused by thought or behavior. It consists
of five subscales including (1) contamination obsessions and wash-
ing compulsions, (2) dressing/grooming compulsions, (3) checking
compulsions, (4) obsessional thoughts of harm to self/others
and (5) obsessional impulses of harm to self/others. This scale
has adequate internal consistency and test–retest reliability (Burns,
Koertege, Formea, & Sternberger, 1996). Internal consistency
achieved in this sample was approaching excellent (a¼ .711).
3.4. State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Form Y-1 (STAI; Spielberger,
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983)
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Form Y-1 is a 20 item self-
report subscale of the STAI designed to measure state anxiety,i.e. how an individual is feeling right now. Each item is rated on a
5-point (0–4) Likert scale of the level of present anxiety. The STAI
has been found to have good reliability and validity (Spielberger
et al., 1983).3.5. Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP)
The IRAP is a computer based measure which presents sets of
stimuli in the form of trials within a series of blocks. On each trial
of the IRAP, a label stimulus was presented at the top of the screen.
There were a total of twelve label stimuli which were digital
images; six were color photographs of things which would evoke
disgust and the other six were color photographs of generically
pleasant images. All but one of the label stimuli were taken from
the International Affective Picture System1 (IAPS; Lang, Bradley &
Cuthbert, 1996). There were a total of twelve target stimuli, six of
which referred to a negative appraisal based on the six cognitive
belief domains of OCD (e.g. ‘‘My Responsibility’’, ‘‘I Must Control’’)
and six of which referred to a positive response (e.g. ‘‘Soothing’’,
‘‘Harmless’’). On each trial of the IRAP, one of the target stimuli
was presented in the middle of the computer screen. Two
response options (‘‘True’’ and ‘‘False’’) were presented on each
trial which appeared at the bottom left- and right-hand corners
of the computer screen, alternating at random between trials
(see Fig. 1).
The IRAP was presented in blocks of 24 trials which encom-
passed four different trial-types; Disgust-Negative Appraisal,
Disgust-Positive Appraisal, Pleasant-Negative Appraisal, Pleasant-
Positive Appraisal. Up to 6 practice blocks were implemented to
ensure an accuracy rate of 80% and a response latency of less than
or equal to 2000 ms. The participants were required to meet these
criteria across a pair of practice blocks, within six or less blocks,
before proceeding to the fixed set of six test blocks. For each block
of 24 trials, all of the label and target stimuli were presented in
various combinations, with the program ensuring that each of the
four trial-types was presented six times in a quasi-random order.
The program also ensured that the same trial-type was not
repeated across successive trials Table 1.
The instructions for the IRAP were presented on paper and
were read through with the experimenter to ensure that partici-
pants understood the nature of the experiment and what was
being asked of them. The experimenter stressed the importance of
speed and accuracy in the IRAP. Each participant was aware that,
at times, they would be required to respond in a manner that may
be consistent with their own beliefs and sometimes in a manner
that may be inconsistent with their beliefs. The experimenter
explicitly classified the pictorial stimuli as ‘‘disgusting’’ or ‘‘non-
disgusting’’ thus providing a context to reduce the likelihood that
participants would respond to the stimuli as being merely
negative or positive. Furthermore, the response options ‘‘True’’
and ‘‘False’’ would likely serve to establish the relations between
the pictures and statements as either relationally coherent or
incoherent. For example, responding ‘‘True’’ to a disgusting
picture and the statement ‘‘My Responsibility’’ asks a participant
to respond to the relationship between the two items as rela-
tionally coherent; responding ‘‘False’’ in this case asks a partici-
pant to indicate that the relationship is incoherent (see Barnes-
Holmes, Hayes, Dymond & O’Hora, 2001, for a more detailed
treatment of ‘‘Truth’’ versus ‘‘Falsity’’). Or in other words, the
response options asked participants to evaluate or ‘‘appraise’’
the relational network in which the pictures and statements
Fig. 1. Examples of the four trial-types from the IRAP. Note. The boxed words (‘‘Consistent’’ and ‘‘Inconsistent’’) and the arrows did not appear on screen for participants.
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there were two rules that they would be required to respond in
accordance with throughout the IRAP task (i.e., one rule for the
consistent blocks and another for the inconsistent blocks). Thus,
the participants were aware of the pattern of responding that
would be required of them throughout the task before they began.
3.6. General procedure
Following informed consent, half the participants were selected
randomly to complete the self-report questionnaires first, followed
by the IRAP, with the remaining participants completing the mea-
surements in the opposite order. The order in which the question-
naires were administered was randomized.4. Results
4.1. Scoring the IRAP
The response latency, defined as the time in milliseconds (ms)
from the onset of a trial to the first response, provides the primarydatum from the IRAP. The IRAP effect is the difference between
the consistent and inconsistent mean response latencies recorded
for a specific trial-type. To insure that IRAP effects were derived
from performances that involved the targeted patterns of stimu-
lus control, response accuracy was assessed first. If accuracy fell
below 70% on a given test block, or pair of test blocks, then the
IRAP effects for that participant were calculated using the
remaining two pairs of test blocks. The data for two participants
were analyzed in this manner. If accuracy fell below 70% across
multiple pairs of tests blocks then the data for that participant
were discarded—the data for one participant were removed on
this basis.
The latency data were transformed into D-IRAP scores using
the adapted version of the Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji (2003)
D-algorithm (see Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012b, for a full
description of this procedure). The D-algorithm is used to mini-
mize the impact of extraneous factors such as age, motor skills,
and/or cognitive ability (Nosek, Greenwald & Banaji, 2007).
Given the foregoing transformation, a larger D-IRAP score
indicates a greater difference in response latencies between
consistent and inconsistent trials. Positive scores indicate
responding in accordance with expected response biases (e.g.,
responding ‘‘True’’ more quickly than ‘‘False’’ when a disgusting
picture appeared with a negative appraisal) and negative scores
indicate responding in a manner that was inconsistent with
expected responses biases (e.g., responding ‘‘False’’ more quickly
than ‘‘True’’ when a disgusting picture appeared with a negative
appraisal). Scores that approach zero indicate no difference
between consistent and inconsistent test blocks.
4.2. Implicit measure analysis
Scores from each trial-type in the IRAP were in the expected
direction and were significant from zero, Disgust-Negative
Appraisal (M¼ .284, SD¼ .332; t (26)¼4.43, p o .0001); Disgust-
Positive Appraisal (M¼ .343, SD¼ .333; t (26)¼5.35, p o .0001);
Table 2
Pearson correlation matrix of Disgust-Negative Appraisal trial-type, OBQ, OCI-R, PI and STAI.
Variable Disgust-Neg OBQ R/T P/C I/CT OCI-R PI Con D/G C/C O/T O/I
Disgust-Neg 1.0
OBQ .48n 1.0
R/T .56nn .93nn 1.0
P/C .43n .94nn .80nn 1.0
I/CT .18 .67nn .52nn .49nn 1.0
OCI-R .17 .61nn .63nn .71nn  .004 1.0
PI .34 .80nn .82nn .80nn .23 .87nn 1.0
CON .03 .52nn .50nn .61nn .03 .80nn .80nn 1.0
D/G  .01 .51n .46n .60nn .12 .72nn .70nn .80nn 1.0
CC .50nn .82nn .86nn .77nn .39n .68nn .83nn .39n .30 1.0
OT .40n .73nn .80nn .66nn .31 .62nn .82nn .45n .36 .84nn 1.0
OI .25  .04 .09  .09  .19 .03 .22 .00 .009 .13 .06 1.0
STAI .16 .54nn .48nn .52# .36 .34 .47nn .30 .30 .41n .51nn .11
Note: OBQ (M¼155, SD¼42) SUBSCALES: R/T¼Responsibility/threat (M¼59, SD¼17), P/C¼Perfectionism/certainty (M¼65, SD¼20), I/CT¼ Importance/control of thoughts
(M¼30, SD¼11).
PI (M¼30, SD¼19) SUBSCALES: CON¼Contamination (M¼10, SD¼7), D/G¼Dressing/grooming (M¼2, SD¼3), C/C¼Checking compulsion (M¼11, SD¼7),
O/T¼Obsessional thoughts of harm to self/others (M¼5, SD¼5), O/I¼Obsessional impulses of harm to self/others (M¼1, SD¼3). STAI (M¼35, SD¼9).
n p o .05.
nn p o .01.
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po .0001); Pleasant-Positive Appraisal (M¼ .358, SD¼ .271; t (26)¼
6.88, p o .0001).
4.3. Correlation analysis
A correlation matrix involving the D-IRAP scores from the
Disgust-Negative Appraisal trial-type and all of the explicit mea-
sures is presented in Table 2. The majority of the remaining
analyses will focus on the Disgust-Negative Appraisal trial-type to
assess response biases that reflected negative interpretations to
pictures that were chosen to evoke disgust responses. The
remaining trial-types will be examined simply to test for diver-
gent validity. Table 2 presents all of the correlations among the
explicit measures simply to confirm that the expected large
number of inter-correlations was observed. The only notable
exception was the absence of any correlation between the
Obsessional Impulses of Harm to Self and Others (OI) and any of
the other measures. Consistent with the general purpose of the
current study, the subsequent set of analyses focused on the
correlations among the D-IRAP score and the explicit measures.
The results indicated that there was a medium positive
correlation between the D-IRAP scores and the OBQ, and two of
its subscales, Responsibility/Threat and Perfectionism/Uncertainty.
The D-IRAP scores failed to correlate with the OCI-R. The relation-
ship between the Padua Inventory and the D-IRAP scores
approached significance, and thus its subscales were included in
the correlation matrix to determine if any specific factors were
driving the correlation toward significance. Two of these five
scales, Compulsive Checking and Obsessional Thoughts of Harm
to Self/Others, yielded moderate positive correlations with the D-
IRAP scores. Finally, the state anxiety measure (STAI) failed to
correlate with the D-IRAP scores. This pattern of correlations
indicates that the more rapidly participants interpret disgusting
pictures as being negative, the more highly they scored on two of
three general measures of Obsessive-Compulsive tendencies, and
on specific sub-scales of these two measures.
A second correlation matrix, which was calculated to assess
patterns of responding between the remaining three trial-types
and the questionnaires, yielded few interesting results (the full
matrix is available for download from the JCBS website). There
were two significant negative correlations between the Pleasant-
Negative Appraisal trial-type and the washing concerns subscale of
the OCI-R (r¼ .40, p¼ .03) and the contamination subscale of thePadua Inventory (r¼ .38, p¼ .05). Thus, the greater the implicit
response bias towards the pleasant stimuli as not being related to
obsessive belief appraisals (i.e., not threatening/their responsibil-
ity/perfect etc) the less contamination fear they reported.
4.4. Predictive validity of the IRAP
As noted in the Introduction, increased levels of anxiety are
often associated with obsessive-compulsive tendencies, and indeed
this was confirmed in the pattern of correlations recorded in
Table 2 with five significant (and one marginally so) correlations
between the anxiety measure and the explicit measures of OCD
tendencies. Although the D-IRAP score failed to correlate with
anxiety it was deemed important to determine if the implicit
measure still predicted obsessive-compulsive tendencies inde-
pendently of anxiety. Similarly, it was important to determine the
predictive validity of the OBQ subscales for scores on the IRAP
while controlling for the other subscales to determine which
factors are possibly implemented in disgust responding. A series
of hierarchical multiple regression analyses were thus conducted
to determine the predictive validity of the D-IRAP measure while
controlling for anxiety and other OC relevant factors (see Table 3).
Results indicated that anxiety was a significant predictor of
OC tendencies as measured by the OBQ, as were the D-IRAP
scores from the Disgust-Negative Appraisal trial-type when anxiety
was controlled for. As can be seen from the subsequent sets
of regression analyses (2, 4, 6, and 7), the Disgust-Negative
Appraisal trial-type predicted OC tendencies independent of
anxiety in all but one case, Obsessional Thoughts of Harm to
Self/Others subscale of the PI. Also, the effect of the Disgust-
Negative Appraisal trial-type for perfectionism/uncertainty was
undermined by responsibility/threat, while perfectionism/uncer-
tainty did not undermine the effect of the IRAP trial-type for
responsibility/threat. Similarly, the effect of the perfectionism/
uncertainty factor for negative disgust responding on the IRAP
was undermined by the responsibility/threat factor, while per-
fectionism/uncertainty did not influence the effect of responsi-
bility/threat for disgust responding.5. Discussion
The results of the present study suggest that the IRAP can
be used as a measurement of the obsessive beliefs of OCD in
Table 3
Results from nine hierarchical multiple regression analyses using the Disgust-Negative Appraisal trial-type and OBQ-44 subscales to predict obsessive beliefs
and sub-components of OC tendencies while controlling for the effects of anxiety and other obsessive beliefs.
B SE B Beta
Dependent variable: OBQ
1. Step 1 (R2¼ .189nn)
Anxiety 1.90 .664 .435nn
Step 2 (R2 change¼ .144nn)
Disgust-Negative Appraisal Trial-Type 52.06 19.22 .380nn
Dependent variable: Responsibility/threat OBQ
2. Step 1 (R2¼ .178nn)
Anxiety .777 .283 .421nn
Step 2 (R2 change¼ .225nn)
Disgust-Negative Appraisal Trial-Type 27.52 7.69 .475nn
3. Step 1(R2¼ .508nnn)
Perfectionism/certainty .636 .106 .713nnn
Step 2 (R2 change¼ .059n)
Disgust-Negative Appraisal Trial-Type 15.13 7.02 .261n
Dependent variable: Perfectionism/certainty OBQ
4. Step 1 (R2¼ .084)
Anxiety .599 .334 .290
Step 2 (R2 change¼ .127n)
Disgust-Negative Appraisal Trial-Type 23.16 9.90 .357n
5. Step 1 (R2¼ .508nnn)
Responsibility/Threat .799 .133 .713nnn
Step 2 (R2 change¼ .000)
Disgust-Negative Appraisal Trial-Type 1.52 8.94 .023
Dependent variable: Checking PI
6. Step 1 (R2¼ .186nn)
Anxiety .333 .118 .431nn
Step 2 (R2 change¼ .168nn)
Disgust-Negative Appraisal Trial-Type 9.99 3.36 .410nn
Dependent variable: Obsessional thoughts of harm to self/others subscale of PI
7. Step 1 (R2¼ .311nnn)
Anxiety .318 .080 .55nnn
Step 2 (R2 change¼ .039)
Disgust-Negative Appraisal Trial-Type 3.55 2.48 .198
Dependent variable: Disgust-Negative Appraisal Trial-Type
8. Step 1 (R2¼ .236nn)
Responsibility/threat .008 .003 .486nn
Step 2 (R2 change¼ .001)
Perfectionism/certainty .001 .003 .036
9. Step 1 (R2¼ .133n)
Perfectionism/certainty .006 .002 .364n
Step 2 (R2 change¼ .104n)
Responsibility/Threat .008 .004 .460n
n p r .05.
nn p o .01.
nnn p o .000.
E. Nicholson et al. / Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science 2 (2013) 23–3028response to disgust-eliciting stimuli. A greater bias toward inter-
preting the disgusting stimuli as being negative predicted overall
scores on the OBQ and specifically scores on the responsibility/
threat and perfectionism/uncertainty subscales of the OBQ. Addi-
tionally, scores on the checking subscale of the Padua Inventory
were predicted by the IRAP. Critically, these effects (from both the
OBQ and the Padua Inventory) were independent of current levels
of anxiety. One effect which was influenced by anxiety was the
relationship between scores on the IRAP and the obsessive
thoughts of harm to the self/others subscale of the PI. The impact
of OC relevant beliefs such as responsibility/threat and perfec-
tionism/uncertainty on the predictive validity of the IRAP were
also examined. The regression analyses indicated that the Disgust-
Negative Appraisal trial-type from the IRAP failed to predict
perfectionism/uncertainty when controlling for responsibility/
threat. However, when controlling for perfectionism/uncertainty,
the IRAP still predicted responsibility/threat, which further high-
lights the role of the latter factor in disgust responding. The lack
of any meaningful relationships between the other trial-types and
self-report measures was indicative of the discriminant validity ofthe IRAP in that only the OC relevant trial-type (Disgust-Negative
Appraisal) was related to obsessive beliefs and other obsessive-
compulsive constructs.
The IRAP used in the current study was not specifically designed
to measure checking compulsions; however, the Disgust-Negative
Appraisal trial-type predicted scores on the checking subscale of the
PI, independently of anxiety. This finding suggests that the IRAP was
tapping into OC-relevant cognitions beyond those measured in the
OBQ, on which it was based. A possible explanation of this finding
could be that checking is often viewed as a by-product of perfection-
ism and as a precursor for uncertainty which is intolerable to OCD
sufferers. Repetitive checking behaviors, which are characteristic to
OCD sufferers, have been demonstrated to facilitate greater uncer-
tainty due to a reduction in the vividness and trustworthiness of
memory (van den Hout & Kindt, 2004). Similarly, perfectionism,
which is often motivated by a desire to avoid highly unlikely
catastrophic events, could be manifested in the form of compul-
sive checking behaviors to prevent a negative event from occurring
(Bouchard, Rheaume & Ladouceur, 1999). Indeed, perfectionism has
been shown to play a specific role in the maintenance of checking
E. Nicholson et al. / Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science 2 (2013) 23–30 29compulsions and this effect was mediated by anxiety (Moretz &
McKay, 2009). It could be argued that, based on the relationship of
the Disgust-Negative Appraisal trial-type to checking, that the present
IRAP was indeed measuring additional cognitions and biases that are
relevant to OCD.
Previous research has found that responsibility appraisals medi-
ated the role of perfectionism on checking and cleaning symptoms
in a normal sample (Yorulmaz, Karancı & Tekok-Kılı, 2006). These
results somewhat reflect the finding in the present study that the
responsibility/threat factor negatively influenced the effect of the
perfectionism/uncertainty factor for disgust responding as measured
by the IRAP. The results obtained by Yorulmaz et al. (2006) drew
distinctions between self and socially orientated perfectionism (see
Hewitt & Flett, 1991); that is responsibility mediated the effect of
self-orientated perfectionism for checking and socially-orientated
perfectionism for cleaning. Based on the statements in the OBQ, the
perfectionism subscale appears to be measuring both self and
socially orientated perfectionism. A possible explanation for the
similarity in findings between the present study and Yorulmaz et al.
(2006) is that cleaning behaviors, along with checking, could be
motivated by a heightened sense of disgust sensitivity which could
be why responsibility/threat influenced the effect of perfectionism/
uncertainty for disgust.
An inflated sense of personal responsibility has long been
considered a vital component of OCD (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989) and
the present results appear to add to existing evidence which
suggests that it may be critical in problematic disgust responding
also. Indeed, previous research has found that the responsibility/
threat subscale was predictive of contamination symptoms in an
OCD population (Wheaton, Abramowitz, Berman, Riemann & Hale,
2010). Teachman (2006) posited that maladaptive disgust respond-
ing could be interpreted in terms of excessive responsibility for
contamination prevention. That is, an individual who has a greater
sensitivity to disgust could interpret disgusting or contaminated
objects in the environment as being their responsibility to clean up
or eliminate (e.g., ‘‘When I see any opportunity to do so, I must act to
prevent bad things from happening’’). However, insofar as the
responsibility/threat factor in the OBQ measures both constructs in
one subscale, further research examining this relationship more
thoroughly is needed to determine the extent to which responsi-
bility and threat individually influence disgust responding.
Previous research using the most popular measure of implicit
attitudes, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee
& Schwartz, 1998), failed to find a significant relationship
between the implicit appraisal of unwanted thoughts as being
personally meaningful and the cognitive belief domains as mea-
sured by the OBQ (Teachman, Woody & Magee, 2006). However, it
is worth noting that the IAT in this study used worded stimuli
such as ‘‘Unwanted Thoughts’’ and ‘‘Wanted Thoughts’’ and a list
of words to categorize each type of thought such as ‘‘Important’’
or ‘‘Meaningful’’ (Teachman et al., 2006). That is, there was no
reference to the specific content of the unwanted thoughts.
Rachman & De Silva (1978) have demonstrated that the majority
of people (both OCD and non-OCD) experience similar intrusive
thoughts in terms of content. The present results using the IRAP,
which presented specific disgust-eliciting stimuli, suggest that
the content of intrusive and unwanted thoughts may be critical
when measuring cognitive belief domains at the implicit level.
Additionally, a detailed examination of the items in the OBQ
brings to light the propositional nature of the measure (e.g.,
‘‘If I don’t act when I foresee danger, then I am to blame for any
consequences’’). The IAT was designed as a measure of the
strength of associations between concepts in memory and it is
widely accepted that IAT effects do not reflect propositional
processes (see De Houwer, 2002, for a detailed explanation). In
contrast, the IRAP is based on a theoretical framework ofcognition that assumes that implicit cognition is highly relational
or propositional in nature (Hughes et al., 2011), and indeed the
IRAP was specifically designed to measure the relational proper-
ties of implicit cognition (e.g. Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012a).
Thus, the finding that scores on the IRAP were related to scores on
the OBQ while the IAT were not supports the use of the IRAP as a
measure of conditional beliefs such as those observed in OCD.
One possible limitation of the current study is that participants
may have been responding to the pictorial stimuli as merely positive
or negative rather than disgusting or non-disgusting. Nevertheless,
this is unlikely given the verbal context that was provided during
instruction. Future research could attempt to utilize negative stimuli,
both disgusting and non-disgusting, however due to the multi-
dimensional nature of disgust, it would be difficult to acquire
negative pictures that could in no way be interpreted as disgusting
in some sense. For instance, items that represent immoral behavior
(i.e., a picture of a swastika or pictures of criminals) have been
known to induce moral disgust (Jones & Fitness, 2008).
While evidence suggests that OC-related responding can be
recorded in a non-clinical population (Burns et al., 1995), a
general limitation of the present study was the use of a non-
clinical student sample. The means and standard deviations of the
self-report measures of OCD and their subscales for the present
sample as a whole were slightly higher than those obtained by
previous research for a student sample, however, were within one
standard deviation (e.g., Burns et al., 1995; Obsessive Compulsive
Cognitions Working Group, 2005). Moreover, thirteen of the
participants produced scores comparable to those produced by a
clinical sample of individuals with a diagnosis of OCD (Obsessive
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2005). This is not unusual
given that student samples have previously been found to
produce higher scores on OCD measures such as the OBQ than
average community samples, which further supports their use in
such research (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group,
2005). Nevertheless, it would be expected that a clinical sample
would produce higher scores than a student sample. Further
research comparing a clinical sample of patients with a diagnosis
of OCD with a non-patient control sample would provide further
insight into the relationship between disgust and the obsessive
belief domains of OCD.6. Conclusions
The current study provides further evidence to add to the
growing literature delineating the relationship between disgust
and OCD. Specifically, the present results parse out the individual
effect of disgust independently of anxiety, which is vital if disgust
is to be viewed as a significant emotion in its own right. The
results further explicate the role of each belief domain in disgust
responding providing greater insight into the cognitive mechan-
isms through which disgust can influence OCD. Teachman (2006)
emphasized the importance of secondary appraisals or interpre-
tations for clarifying findings in the literature regarding disgust
and the anxiety disorders. While more research is needed, the
evidence in the literature is becoming more suggestive that the
negative interpretation of the initial intrusive feeling of disgust
can have extremely damaging consequences, particularly in OCD.
Wheaton et al. (2010) called for behavioral measures of OCD in
order to circumvent the pitfalls of working exclusively with self-
report measures and the IRAP appears to offer a novel way of
measuring these cognitive beliefs relevant to OCD. While the use
of the IRAP in this domain is in the early stages, and further
research assessing its use at different symptomatic levels is
needed, the results from the current research appear promising.
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